


Theory and Practice of Succinct Zero Knowledge Proofs

Lecture 03: SNARKs from Polynomial Interactive Oracle Proofs

Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs)

[Mic94, Groth10, GGPR13, Groth16...
..., GWC19, CHMMW20, ...]



SNARKs

- **Completeness:** $\forall (F, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}, \Pr \left[\mathbf{V}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) = 1 : \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(F) \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathbf{P}(\text{pk}, x, w) \end{array} \right] = 1.$

- **Knowledge Soundness:** \forall efficient $\tilde{\mathbf{P}}, \exists$ extractor \mathbf{E} s.t.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{V}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) = 1 \\ \wedge \\ (F, x, w) \notin \mathcal{R} \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(F) \\ \pi \leftarrow \tilde{\mathbf{P}}(\text{pk}, x) \\ w \leftarrow \mathbf{E}_{\tilde{\mathbf{P}}}(\text{pk}, x) \end{array} \right] \approx 0$$


- **Zero Knowledge:** \exists simulator Sim s.t. $\forall (F, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$, and all $\tilde{\mathbf{V}}$,

$$\Pr \left[\mathbf{V}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) : \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(F) \\ \pi \leftarrow \text{Sim}(\text{pk}, x) \end{array} \right] = \Pr \left[\tilde{\mathbf{V}}(\text{vk}, x, \pi) : \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(F) \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathbf{P}(\text{pk}, x, w) \end{array} \right]$$

- **Succinctness:** $|\pi| = O(\log |F|)$ and $\text{Time}(\mathbf{V}) = O(\log |F|, |x|)$

Constructing zkSNARKs

Blueprint



Which function to pick?

Polynomial commitments:

- $F_z(m)$: Interpret m as univariate poly $f(X)$ in $\mathbb{F}[X]$ and evaluate at z

Multilinear commitments:

e.g., $f(x_1, \dots, x_k) = x_1x_3 + x_1x_4x_5 + x_7$

- $F_{\vec{z}}(m)$: Interpret m as multilinear poly $f(X)$ in $\mathbb{F}[\vec{X}]$ and evaluate at \vec{z}

Vector commitments:


- $F_i(m)$: Interpret m as vector v in \mathbb{F}^n and return v_i

Inner-product commitments:


- $F_{\vec{q}}(m)$: Interpret m as vector \vec{v} in \mathbb{F}^n and return $\langle \vec{v}, \vec{q} \rangle$

Which to pick?

A: Polynomials!




Let's pick polynomials



Polynomial
Interactive
Oracle
Proofs

Polynomial IOPs [GWC19, CHMMVW20, BFS20]



- **Completeness:** Whenever $(F, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$, there is a strategy for P that outputs **only polynomials**, and which causes V to accept.
- **Knowledge Soundness:** Whenever V accepts against a P that outputs **only polynomials**, then P “knows” w such that $(F, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$.
- **Bounded-query ZK:** Whenever $(F, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$, a V that makes up to b queries to polys learns nothing about w .

Majority of innovation is in PIOPs

Fluoropop: Fractional decomposition-based lookups in quasi-linear time independent of table size

Sonic: Zero-Knowledge SNARKs from Linear-Size Universal and Updatable Structured Reference Strings

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PlonK: Permutations over Lagrange-bases for Oecumenical Noninteractive arguments of Knowledge

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Function Technologies

Dmitry Khovratovich
Ethereum Foundation

Ariel Gabizon*
Aztec

Zachary J. Williamson
Aztec

Oana Ciobotaru

MARLIN: Preprocessing zkSNARKs with Universal and Updatable SRS

Spartan: Efficient and general-purpose zkSNARKs without trusted setup

HyperPlonk: Plonk with Linear-Time Prover and High-Degree Custom Gates

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Microsoft Research

Binyi Chen
Espresso Systems

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Lunar: a Toolbox for More Efficient Universal and Updatable zkSNARKs and Commit-and-Prove Extensions

Caulk: Lookup Arguments in Sublinear Time

Arantxa Zapico¹, Vitalik Buterin², Dmitry Khovratovich², Mary Maller², Anca Nitulescu³, and Mark Simkin²

¹ Universitat Pompeu Fabra¹

² Ethereum Foundation¹

³ Protocol Labs³

Matteo Campanelli¹, Antonio Faonio², Dario Fiore³, Anaïs Querol^{3,4}, and Hadrián Rodríguez³

plouppop: A simplified polynomial protocol for lookup tables

qq*: Cached quotients for fast lookups

Ariel Gabizon
Aztec

Zachary J. Williamson
Aztec

Liam Eagen
Blockstream

Dario Fiore
IMDEA software institute


Ariel Gabizon
Zeta Function Technologies

Baloo: Nearly Optimal Lookup Arguments

Arantxa Zapico*, Ariel Gabizon³, Dmitry Khovratovich¹, Mary Maller¹, and Carla Ràfols²


Polynomial Commitments

Polynomial Commitments



- **Completeness:** Whenever $p(z) = v$, **R** accepts.
- **Extractability:** Whenever **R** accepts, **S**'s commitment **cm** “contains” a polynomial p of degree at most D .
- **Hiding:** **cm** and π reveal *no* information about p other than v

Polynomial Commitments



For efficiency improvements, you need

- Batch commitment
- Batch opening

A selection of constructions



In the last 10 years, several constructions with different

- Cryptographic assumptions
- Prover and verifier efficiency and proof sizes
- Homomorphism and batching properties

	KZG10	PST13	IPA	Hyrax	Dory	BFS20
crypto	Pairings	Pairings	DLog + RO	DLog + RO	Pairing + RO	GUO + RO
# variables	1	m	1	m	1	1
setup type	Private	Private	Public	Public	Public	Public
commitment size	$O(1) G$	$O(1) G$	$O(1) G$	$O(2^{m/2}) G$	$O(1) G$	$O(1) G$
proof size	$O(1) G$	$O(m) G$	$O(\log d) G$	$O(2^{m/2}) G$	$O(\log d) G$	$O(\log d) G$
verifier time	$O(1) G$	$O(m) G$	$O(d) G$	$O(2^{m/2}) G$	$O(\log d) G$	$O(\log d) G$

PIOP + PC = SNARK

PIOPs + PC Schemes \rightarrow SNARK



+ Fiat-Shamir to get non-interactivity

Properties


- **Completeness:** Follows from completeness of **PC** and **AHP**.
- **Proof of Knowledge:** Whenever **V** accepts but $C(x, w) = 0$, we can construct either an adversarial prover against **PIOP**, or an adversary that breaks extractability of **PC**.
- **Zero Knowledge:** Follows from hiding of **PC** and bounded-query ZK of **AHP**.
- **Verifier efficiency:**
$$T(\text{ARG.VERIFY}) = T(\text{PIOP.VERIFY}) + T(\text{PC.CHECK})$$

Verifier Complexity of PIOP-based SNARKs

$$T(\text{SNARK.V}) = T(\text{CHECK}) + T(\text{PIOP.V})$$

Can make this sublinear (eg: KZG)

What about this?



PIOP Verifier has to **at least** read (F, x)

- When size of $F \ll$ size of computation (eg machine computations), **TIME(v) is sublinear.**
- When size of $F =$ size of computation (eg circuit computations), **TIME(v) is linear!**

A simple PIOP

Background on polynomials

Polynomial over \mathbb{F} :

$p(X) = a_0 + a_1X + \dots + a_dX^d$ where $a_i \in \mathbb{F}$ and X takes values in \mathbb{F} .


Polynomial Interpolation:

Given a list $A = (a_0, \dots, a_d)$, and a set $H \subseteq \mathbb{F}$, we can interpolate A over H to obtain $p(X)$ such that $p(h_i) = a_i$ where h_i is the i -th element of H .

Vanishing polynomial:


The vanishing polynomial for $H \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ is $v_H(X)$ such that $v_H(h) = 0 \quad \forall h \in H$

Warmup: PIOP for Equality



- **Completeness:** If $p_1 = p_2$, then definitely $p_1(r) = p_2(r)$.
- **Soundness:** If $p_1 \neq p_2$, then $p_1(r) = p_2(r) \implies r$ is a root of $q := p_1 - p_2$. But since r is random, this happens with probability $\frac{\deg(q)}{|\mathbb{F}|}$

Warmup: PIOP for Equality over Domain



- **Completeness:** If $p_1 = p_2$, then definitely $p_1(r) = p_2(r)$.
- **Soundness:** Define $q := p_1 - p_2$. Then $\forall h \in H, p_1(h) = p_2(h)$ if and only if $q = s \cdot v_H$. But we can check this via the previous PIOP.